Norms of Cooperation*
Cristina Bicchieri
REDUCTIONIST STRATEGIES

A longstanding tradition in the social sciences contrasts instrumental

rationality and social norms as alternative ways of explaining action.
Rational choice theory defines action as the outcome of a practical inference

that takes preferences and beliefs as premises. An explanation in terms
of norms depicts a socialized actor whose behavior is not outcome oriented,
since when acting in accordance with a norm one does not engage in a
rational calculation nor does one pay very much attention to the consequences. Attempts at bridging the gap have either tried to establish
that social norms are rational, in the sense of being efficient means to
achieve individual or social welfare, or that it is rational to conform to
norms, thus reducing compliance to utility maximization.
The first reductionist strategy makes a typical post hoc, ergo propter
hoc fallacy, since the mere presence of a social norm does not justify
inferring that it is there to accomplish some social function. Besides, it

does not account for the fact that many social norms are inefficient, as
in the case of discriminatory norms against women and blacks, or are so
rigid as to prevent the fine-tuning that would be necessary to successfully

accommodate new cases. Even if a norm is a means to achieve a social
end, such as cooperation, retribution, or fairness, usually it is not the
sole means. Many social norms are underdetermined with respect to the
collective objectives they may serve, nor can they be ordered according
to a criterion of greater or lesser efficiency in meeting these goals. Such
an ordering would be feasible only if it were possible to show that one
norm among others is the best means to attain a given social objective.
Often, though, the objectives themselves are defined by means of some
norm.

Consider as an example norms of revenge; until not long ago, a
Sicilian man who "dishonored" another man's daughter or sister had to
make amends for the wrong by marrying the woman or pay for his
rashness with his own life. The objective was to restore the family's lost
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honor, but the social norms dictating the ways in which this could be
done were the only means available to identify honor in those circumstances.
One may think that some form of monetary compensation would have

worked equally well, if not better, in the case in which a marriage was
impossible. It would have spared one, perhaps many, lives. But accepting

a monetary compensation was not revenge, and since nobody would have
ever accepted such an atonement, nobody would have even thought of
offering it. Approving of the man who exacts revenge, calling him a
"man of honor," does not necessarily involve approval of the norm as

rational or efficient. Even if one thinks a norm unjust and useless, it may
be difficult not to conform, since violation involves a collective action

problem: nobody wants to be the first to risk social disapproval by breaking
the norm openly. That is why people will often break a norm in private
but still pay lip service to it in public.

The second reductionist strategy argues that-provided that con-

formity to a norm attracts approval and transgression, disapprovalconforming is the rational thing to do, since nobody willfully attracts
discredit and punishment. If others' approval and disapproval act as
external sanctions, we again have a cost-benefit argument. When there
is nobody around to watch what we do and we still conform to the
norm-the argument goes-it is because we have internalized these
positive and negative sanctions. Yet to maintain that we conform to social
norms because of the disapproval involved in violating them is of little
help in explaining why norms are there, how they emerged, and why
they persist. To say that one conforms because of the negative sanctions
involved in nonconformity does not distinguish norm-abiding behavior
from an obsession, in which one feels an inner constraint to repeat the
same action in order to quiet some "bad" thought, or from an entrenched
habit that cannot be shed without great uneasiness. Nor does it distinguish
norms from hypothetical imperatives enforced by sanctions, such as the
rule that prohibits smoking in public areas. In all these cases, avoidance
of the sanctions involved in transgression constitutes a decisive reason
to conform, independently of what others do.
The line of argument I wish to pursue is biased in favor of a different

kind of reduction. Making norms rational, or making it unconditionally
rational to conform to a norm, takes norms for granted. Asking why
social norms are there, or why we tend to conform to them, does not
shed any light on the norm formation process, since how norms emerge
is a different story from why they emerge and become stable. The thesis
I wish to sustain is that social norms are the outcome of learning in a
strategic interaction context; hence, they are a function of individual

choices and, ultimately, of individual preferences and beliefs. The view
that norms are reducible to the preferences and beliefs of those who
follow them is not new. David Lewis and Edna Ullmann-Margalit have
proposed a game-theoretic account of norms and conventions according
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to which a norm is broadly defined as an equilibrium.' The conventional
game-theoretic account has serious limits, though. For one, it is a static
description of norms as clusters of self-fulfilling expectations; it cannot

explain, nor was it meant to, how expectations come to be self-fulfilling.
The equilibrium account of norms must be supplemented with a story
of how interacting agents learn to recognize a behavioral pattern, how

they settle upon a stable pattern, and what sort of behavior is more likely
to be sustainable.
Learning a behavioral pattern must not be confused with socialization,

the process through which the newcomer comes to accept an established
group's norm. Since our subject is the development of new norms in
a group, learning cannot be separated from emergence. The size of
the group matters, though. If learning can easily occur in two-person
interactions, it may be impossible in a large population, where all that
one observes is aggregate behavior. Norms may emerge through learning
in a small group and subsequently spread to a large population by some

other mechanism. In the last section of the article, I propose an evolutionary

account of the propagation of norms from small groups to large populations.

Finally, an analysis of emergence, as opposed to one stressing the
functions fulfilled by social norms, may shed light upon the differences
between social norms and other types of regularities, such as hypothetical
imperatives, moral codes, or legal norms as well as upon those char-

acteristics which are common to all social norms, however different
they might be.
EQUILIBRIUM

Norms serve to guide an individual's behavior but also to allow an individual
to anticipate others' behavior. We expect people to conform to norms

and expect others to expect us to conform, too. A social norm is, in a
way, a cluster of expectations. Expectations, I want to argue, play a crucial
role in sustaining a norm. Indeed, conformity to a social norm is not
unconditional; it is, rather, a conditional choice based on expectations
about other people's behavior and beliefs. One's interest in avoiding the
negative consequences of transgression, as well as the feelings of shame
and guilt that may accompany it, reinforce one's tendency to conform.
But they are not the sole, nor the ultimate, determinants of conformity.
Reducing conformity to unconditional utility maximization overlooks the
conditional element which characterizes norm-abiding behavior. Besides,
approval and disapproval are sanctions that presuppose the existence of
norms that everyone expects to be followed. Consider a community that
abides by a strict norm of truth telling. A foreigner that, upon entering

1. D. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); E. UllmannMargalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
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the community, systematically violates this norm will be met with hostility,
if not utterly excluded from the group. But suppose a large group of
liars makes its way into this small society. Probably the truth-telling norm
would cease to exist, since the strength of a norm lies in its being followed

by almost all of the participants.
It may seem that most people's experience of conformity to a norm

is beyond rational calculation. Compliance may look like a habit, thoughtless
and automatic, or it may be driven by feelings of anxiety at the thought
of what would happen if one transgresses the norm. Yet conformity to
a norm may be rational and may be explained in terms of one's beliefs
and desires, even though one does not conform out of a rational calculation.
As David Lewis himself pointed out in his analysis of habits, a habit may
be under an agent's rational control in the sense that should that habit

ever cease to serve the agent's desires according to his beliefs, it would
at once be overridden and abandoned.2 Similarly, an explanation in terms
of norms does not compete with one in terms of expectations and preferences, since a norm persists precisely because of certain expectations
and preferences: if I ever wanted to be different, or if I expected others
to do something different, I would probably overcome the force of the
norm.

One is not constantly aware of one's preferences and desires, which
are better described as dispositions to act in a certain way in certain

circumstances. What is required is that such motives be ready to manifest
themselves in the relevant circumstances. If somebody were to ask you
now if you prefer a Caribbean holiday and five thousand dollars to a
punch in the nose and ten thousand dollars, I do not know what your
answer would be. Whatever option you would choose, it is likely that you

would never have thought of it before; you would not know, for example,
that you preferred the Caribbean holiday and five thousand dollars until
you were put in the condition to choose. Analogously, when conforming
to a norm, one may be unaware of the expectations and preferences that

underlie one's behavior and which become manifest only when they
happen to be unfulfilled.
What sort of preferences and expectations underlie the conditional

choice to conform? A norm is there because everyone expects everyone
else to conform, and everyone knows he is expected to conform, too,

but expectations alone cannot motivate a choice. If my compliance is
grounded on the expectation of almost universal compliance, it must be
that I prefer to comply with the norm on condition that almost everyone

else complies, too. When going to a dinner party, I do not wear sneakers,
not simply because I expect everybody to wear proper shoes but because
I also prefer to wear proper shoes if everybody else does. Note that I do

2. D. Lewis, "Languages and Language," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Scien
ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), vol. 3, p. 25. See
also "Convention: Reply to Jamieson," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975): 113-20.
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not need to assume that the other guests at the dinner party also have

conditional preferences. My belief that they will wear proper shoes may

be grounded on the idea that they actively dislike sneakers or that perhaps
they are very traditional and not given to casual dressing. Of course, I
might fear that disappointing their expectations will bring about contempt
and thus have some additional good reason to wear proper shoes. But

this is an independent, secondary reason.
More generally, a social norm (N) in a population (P) can be defined

as a function of the beliefs and preferences of the members of P if the
following conditions hold:
1. Almost every member of P prefers to conform to N on the
condition that almost everyone else conforms, too.3
2. Almost every member of P believes that almost every other
member of P conforms to N.

Conditions 1 and 2 define a social norm as sustained by the beliefs
and preferences of those who conform to it; they tell us that a social
norm is an equilibrium in the game-theoretic sense of being a combination
of strategies, one for each individual, such that each individual's strategy
is a best reply to the others' strategies, were the others' strategies taken

as given. Each maximizes his expected utility by conforming, on the
condition that nearly everybody else conforms to the norm. Note that
conditional preference indicates that conformity is not a dominant strategy;
if it were, then one would have a reason to conform independently of
what other people were expected to do, in which case the equilibrium
would not be called a social norm.
A norm is an equilibrium that is supported by a configuration of
self-fulfilling expectations: if almost everybody expects most members
of P to conform, then almost everybody will conform, given conditional
preference for conformity. Jon Elster has argued that the distinction

between rational, outcome-oriented behavior and behavior guided by
social norms can be upheld by comparing the expectations that accompany
norms with those characterizing strategic interaction. In the latter case,

''expectations can be derived endogenously from the assumption of rational
actors," whereas the expectations involved in social norms are given prior
to the interaction.4
There are relatively few cases in which one can infer what actors

will do from the assumption that they are rational. One such case is that
of zero-sum games, in which a player's optimal choice against a rational
opponent is a maximin mixed strategy. Another case is a game in which

one or more players have a dominant strategy. In both situations ex3. For a social norm to exist, it is not necessary to have universal conformity. On this

point, see Lewis, Convention, p. 97.
4. See J. Elster, "Rationality and Social Norms" (University of Chicago, 1987, mimeographed), pp. 15-16.
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pectations can be endogenously derived, provided it is common knowledge
that the players are rational. My view is that neither zero-sum games nor

games in which there are dominant strategies are suitable models for the
emergence of norms.
It is unlikely that norms would emerge out of situations of pure

conflict. As Ullmann-Margalit has persuasively argued, even when social
norms contribute to maintain a status quo which discriminates in favor

of one of the parties, some bargaining occurs. Interests are not diametrically
opposed in that the coercing party needs the other's cooperation to
achieve his aims: he can threaten a sanction or promise a benefit and is

liable to be punished if he does not stick to his part of the bargain.5
The case of dominant strategies is quite different. Here at least one

player's choice is independent of any expectation he may have, which
makes his preference for a given course of action unconditional. Consider
the following game:
Game 1
Player 2
Left Right
Top 2, 2 1, 3

Player 1

Bottom 1, 5 0, 1

Here player 1 has a dominant strategy, which is to play Top. Note
that 1 does not need to have any expectation about player 2's choice,

since by playing Top he is always better off, whatever 2 does. His preferen
for Top is unconditional, as is his rational choice of it. Player 2 instead
has no dominant strategy; hence, he has to guess 1's choice in order to
make his. Knowing (or believing) that 1 is rational, he can predict that
Top will be chosen; hence, he chooses to play Right. Player 2's preference
for Right is conditional upon l's choosing Top, as his choice of Right is
rational only with respect to his expectation of l's play. In this case,
player 2's expectations can be endogenously derived by simply assuming
player l's rationality.
Since social norms involve conditional preferences, the presence

of dominant strategies would violate condition 1. One would conform
irrespective of what others do, but then it would become impossible
to distinguish a norm from a habit or a moral imperative. We must
conclude that an equilibrium characterization of norms must always

take expectations as given, as the conditions under which they can be

endogenously inferred from a rationality assumption do not obtain.
Here is a different example:

5. Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms, chap. 10.
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Game 2

Player 2
L R
T 2, 1 0,0

Player 1
B 0,0 1,2

The game has two pure-strategy equilibria, Top Left and Bottom
Right, and each is preferred to the other by one of the players. Because
there are no dominant strategies, the assumption that players are rational
does not suffice to make a choice. Each player has to guess what the
other will do, but what each will do is a function of what he believes the
other will do, leading to an infinite regress of expectations. Player 1
prefers Top in case player 2 plays Left, but if he expects 2 to play Right,
it is better for him to play Bottom. Similar reasoning applies to player

2. Each has conditional preferences and makes a conditional choice,
which is rational only insofar as it is consistent with the expectations he
holds.
Suppose game 2 represents the well-known telephone game: two
people are talking over the phone but the connection is bad and the

conversation gets interrupted. There are two possible ways to continue
the communication: either the one who called first calls again or they
take turns in calling. If player 1 called first, taking turns is best for him

(2, 1), whereas his calling again is best for player 2 (1, 2). Each equilibrium
represents a different norm, upheld by a different set of expectations.
If the two players happen to share the same expectations, they also share
the same norm.

It may turn out that one equilibrium is more conspicuous than the

other to the players. For example, one of the two parties may be much
older than the other, and the society in which they live might have great
regard for seniority. Then it would be tacitly assumed that the younger
party calls first. One can imagine many other criteria, each of which
identifies an equilibrium as a focal point in Schelling's sense.6 But even
assuming that no conflict arises over which criterion of choice is appropriate
to the case, the existence of focal points begs the question. For a focal
point to exist, it must be common knowledge among the players that
they describe the game in the same way, but unless it is explicitly assumed,
there is no reason to believe that common knowledge exists. If, instead,
common knowledge is assumed, the focal point equilibrium as well as
the expectations that support it are exogenous to the game; but then a
significant part of the coordination problem has been assumed away.
What stands in need of explanation is precisely how and whether common
knowledge can be achieved and focal points can become such.
6. See T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1960).
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We have specified the contingencies such that they favor Elster's
claim that social norms involve exogenous expectations but not his claim
that this is the characteristic that differentiates norm-guided behavior
from strategic behavior. Conditions 1 and 2 reconcile norms with strategic
behavior, but at a price: characterizing social norms as equilibria spells
out the conditions under which norms can be upheld but does not indicate
how these conditions can be realized. Since social norms are standards
of behavior which have come to be expected by a community in a particular
social setting, to describe how expectations become self-fulfilling is part
of an explanation of how norms emerge.
NORMS OF COOPERATION

The class of norms I wish to discuss is that of norms of cooperation.
These norms play an important role in collective action situations, which

are closely related to the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. In such games,
each player has a dominant strategy and rationality dictates choosing it,
irrespective of what one expects other players to choose. Specifically,
each person can choose whether or not to cooperate, and there is no
external authority to enforce sanctions on the defectors. Defection is thus
costless, whereas cooperation is costly. Typical examples include voting,
polluting, littering, saving electricity during a hot summer, and supporting
public causes. In all of these cases, the benefits of cooperation depend
upon the number of cooperators. In many of them, this number need
not be the totality of those concerned. If enough people vote, refrain
from consuming electricity, or support a public cause, all will benefit
from the outcome. But those who did not register, kept their air conditioners

at full power, or stayed home instead of going around collecting signatures
will benefit even more, since they cannot be excluded from enjoying the
product of the collective effort of others, while they did not pay any
price to start with. In cases such as littering or polluting, where a small
number of defectors is enough to do the damage, nearly universal co-

operation is needed for the socially desirable outcome to obtain. It is

enough that a few people start throwing garbage on a clean beach to
induce newcomers to imitate them, since walking to a distant trash can
seems futile when the beach is already spoiled. In each case, cooperation
involves the risk of a net loss: if too many people defect, those who
cooperate pay the cost and reap no benefit.
Rational, self-interested individuals should therefore always defect,

even if the collective outcome from joint defection is not Pareto optimal.
It would be better for everybody to cooperate, but since cooperation is
a dominated strategy, any agreement to cooperate would fail to be selfenforcing, as each player would have an incentive to cheat on the other.
Then what stands in need of explanation is the fact that Prisoner'sDilemma-like situations often do not result in disastrous outcomes; instead

we observe that-overall-people tend to cooperate. There are occasions
in which cooperative behavior is compatible with rationality. When the
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cooperator/defector is not anonymous, cooperation may be expected
even in the absence of external sanctions, since it may be in the individual's
interest to form a reputation for being a cooperative type. If one lives

in a small community, it may turn out that it is better to return the favors

one receives, to pay one's debts, and in general to avoid exploiting one's
neighbors, since once one has a reputation for being an untrustworthy
person, he will never again receive help and will possibly be cheated by
the rest of the group. Being cooperative in this case is a form of "global
maximization," in that one is prepared to forgo a gain now for a greater

future benefit.7
Defection should be expected in all those circumstances in which an
individual is anonymous, as is the case with large groups such as the
firms in a competitive industry or the shareholders of a company. Defection
should also occur in small groups, either when it is known that the group
will dissolve on a given future date or when some member of the group
plans to leave for good. Similarly, if the members of a community believe

that it is coming to an end, the belief, however ungrounded, may be selffulfilling, in that all sorts of defections will be rationally justified.
Interactions that have a well-defined time limit can be represented
as finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games in which the players know

both the structure of the game and their respective rationalities (in fact,
they need to have k-level iterated knowledge of both, where k depends
on the length of the game).8 In such games, the unique solution is to
defect. This conclusion is obtained by working backward from the last
play. In the last play, what happened before is strategically irrelevant
and there is no future. Hence, the dominant strategy is to defect. At the

penultimate stage, the players can infer from what they know about the
game and each other what will happen in the last stage. They know that

what they choose now will have no effect on their choices at the last stage
and therefore choose to defect at the penultimate stage, too. This reasoning
leads them to defect at each stage of the finitely repeated game.

When cooperation occurs, it might be due neither to a change in
preferences nor to the fact that people commit themselves to nonexploitative behavior. The fact that one's exploitative behavior is likely to

be detected and sanctioned by future ostracism is a powerful deterrent,
but these interactions have a known time limit. Cooperation becomes
less surprising if we think that rationality, far from being a specific, clear-

cut mode of action, is an inference to the best choice, given the beliefs

7. See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Syrens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
chap. 1.

8. See C. Bicchieri, "Backward Induction without Common Knowledge," in Proceedings

of the Philosophy of Science Association Meeting (1988), vol. 2, and "Self-Refuting Theories of
Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge," Erkenntnis 30 (1989): 69-85.
Compare also P. Pettit and R. Sugden, "The Backward Induction Paradox," Journal of
Philosophy 4 (1989): 1-14.
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we have about the circumstances of play. For example, cooperation can
result when the players have slight doubts about each other's rationality.9
Suppose one player suspects the other to be "irrational" and to play,
say, a tit-for-tat strategy, with some small probability ? > 0. If the suspected
player knows it, she has an interest in confirming the suspicion by avoiding
all moves that will reveal that she is rational. Thus she will not respond
to defection with cooperation nor will she fail to cooperate following a
cooperative move of the other player. Playing "as if" she were a tit-fortat player, she hopes to induce the opponent to respond "kindly." In this
case it is possible to cooperate for a long stretch, the total number of
noncooperative plays being bounded above by a number which depends
on E. The same result obtains if each player is rational and knows that
the other is rational but neither knows that the other knows that he is
rational. Then nobody is cheated but everybody has an interest in acting
as if he were.

A cooperative equilibrium is supported by a configuration of expectations that makes it rational to choose a cooperative pattern of play.
Reason does not favor one course of action over another, irrespective of
players' expectations, so if one player expects the other to be less than
fully rational, cooperation might ensue. Tit for tat, however, is only one

of many possible cooperative patterns of play. For example, in a Prisoner's
Dilemma game repeated fifty times, player 1 may decide to cooperate

(C) in the first round, and for the next rounds n = 2, . .. , t < 50 to
choose C in period n unless player 2 chose to defect (D) in period n 1. For rounds n > t, he will always defect, regardless of the other player's

choice. Were player 2 to play D in period n - 1, player 1 will respond
with D in period n. He may keep playing D until player 2 chooses C and
then play C again. However, he may signal to player 2 his willingness to

cooperate by returning to play C immediately after he played D in the
previous round. Or they may alternate in playing C and D. In general,
since a cooperative pattern is better for both, there will be several co-

operative equilibria.
With multiple equilibria, it may be impossible to predict which one
will in fact be attained or whether one will be achieved at all by the
players. Since cooperative behavior makes sense only under conditions

of uncertainty about the other player's type, a cooperative equilibrium

presumes that the players make the "right" probability assessments abou
each other's type. This consideration is particularly relevant since in real
life one has to convince the opponent that one is likely to be a tit-for-

tat player, while in these games the probability that a player is tit for tat
is given and assumed to be common knowledge among the players.

Conventional game theory gives no plausible description of how individuals'

9. See D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 245-52.
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beliefs come to converge, which calls for an understanding of belief
formation and evolution.
Usually when we witness "spontaneous" cooperative behavior, we
tend to credit it to the existence of norms. Different patterns of cooperation

are made to correspond to different norms of cooperation, which can
be theoretically represented as focal-point equilibria of Prisoner's-Dilemmatype games. Here, too, the question arises as to how a population playing
a given game over and over converges to some stationary equilibrium
pattern of play. Unless one takes these norms as primitive, thus falling
back into some form of equilibrium reasoning, it remains to be shown
how the norms get established and what sort of mechanisms support
them.

The equilibrium definition of norms we have provided does not

make any distinction between a norm that is followed by relatively few
people and a norm that is shared by an entire population. Examples of
the first are all those regular patterns of behavior that evolve in families,
among friends, or in small, cohesive groups such as clubs and teams.
The second type of norm is best illustrated by traffic rules, norms of

etiquette, and all forms of racial or sexual discrimination. These latter
are norms of cooperation, since they allow a large group, sometimes an

entire population, to benefit from excluding some other group from
certain activities or goods. What distinguishes the two types of norms is
the process through which they come into existence. In both cases, individuals will form some beliefs about other individuals, and if enough
individuals share the same beliefs, they will act in a way that will make
their beliefs self-fulfilling. In both cases individuals will learn to detect
behavioral patterns, but the process of learning will differ according to
the size of the group. Even in the absence of communication, in a twoperson repeated interaction there is scope for signaling and for experimenting with different actions. In large groups, instead, one's actions
go mostly undetected and all that one observes is the aggregate behavior

of the group, which is the sole predictor of future outcomes. The individual's influence on the group is marginal, so there is no point in signaling
or experimenting.
Although a norm may emerge through learning in a two-person
interaction, it may never spread to a population, and if it does, the
mechanism accounting for its diffusion is likely to be very different from
that which explains its formation. Size will not matter much in those
cases in which the passage from few to many individuals does not involve
a change of incentives. To illustrate this point, take the case of neighborhood
segregation: a white family may prefer to stay in a certain neighborhood
as long as other white families stay, so that if everybody expects others
to stay, there will be no incentive to leave. When a black family moves
in, the immediate neighbors may take it as a sign that further changes

in the racial balance will follow. This fear may induce them to move,
thereby generating further worries in their immediate neighbors, who
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may also decide to relocate. This "snowball" effect is an example of
spontaneous coordination: it takes the action of one or two individuals

(families, in this case) to generate a collective outcome involving an entire
population. The norm "do not live in a racially mixed neighborhood" is
an example of a pattern of behavior that, once established among a few
individuals, rapidly spreads to larger numbers through a mechanism of
self-fulfilling expectations. Moreover, the greater the number of people

who move away, the stronger becomes the incentive to move. With norms
of cooperation, instead, the incentives to follow the norm are inversely
proportional to the number of people involved. This is why it is so difficult
to specify a plausible process of norm formation, especially in those cases
in which a norm of reciprocity is shared by an entire population.
LEARNING TO COOPERATE

Imagine two individuals engaged in a Prisoner's-Dilemma-type game

which they know will be repeated a finite number of times. They do not
know each other nor do they have previous experience with this situation.
These people are rational and know that joint cooperation is better than

joint defection, but each has no idea of what sort of player her opponent
is. After each round of play, each learns how her opponent has played
and adapts her subsequent choices to what has been learned. There are

many ways a player can adapt, depending on such variables as memory,
pattern-recognition capability, and the ability to take into account the
effects of her own adjustments upon her opponent's play.
Let us start by considering the simplest possible case of adaptation:

the players are "limited strategists," in that they simply adapt their choice
to the action taken by the opponent on the preceding play. Such agents

will not try to identify complex patterns of play nor will they change
their strategy in response to another player's moves.
Each player will start by cooperating/defecting and will subsequently
respond with cooperation/defection to the action taken by the opponent.
There are eight possible adaptive rules the players may choose:

Subsequent plays
If other did If other did
Rule

First

play

C

D

1.

C

C

2.

C

C

C

D

3.

C

D

C

4.

C

D

D

5.

D

C

C

6.

D

C

D

7.

D

D

C

8.

D

D

D
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Rule 1 is 'unconditional cooperation'; rule 2 is 'tit for tat'. Rules 3,

4, 5, and 7 make little sense, as they do not clearly indicate either good
will or an exploitative attitude; rather, 4 and 5 seem to indicate a con-

tradictory attitude, whereas 3 and 7 just tell a player to do the contrary
of what the other did before. Rule 6 would be adopted by a cautious
player, ready to respond cooperatively to a cooperative opponent but

unwilling to be exploited even once by a defector; rule 8 is 'unconditional
defection', which may be adopted by an overly pessimistic player. We
suppose the players' choice of a rule to mirror their psychological pro-

pensities, and since we assume the players to be adaptive in a very limited
way, we do not expect them to change their strategy in the course of
play, since this option would entail far greater learning capabilities on
their part. Rules 3, 4, 5, and 7 can be eliminated, since they present
combinations of initial moves and adaptive responses that make no sense,

and in such a limited adaptive situation they cannot be perceived as
"signaling" some complex pattern of play. The players are left with rules

1, 2, 6, and 8 to choose from.'0
Now suppose that the players are playing 100 repetitions of the
following Prisoner's Dilemma game:
Game 3
B

C D

C 3,3 0,5
A

D 5,0 1, 1

Since the players have four possible patterns of play to choose from,

they face the following four-by-four game, in which each of the four
rules is a strategy that will be played in the 100 repetitions of the above

Prisoner's Dilemma, and the payoffs are the undiscounted sum of the
payoffs each player obtains in each repetition of the game:
B

1

2

6

8

1 300, 300 300, 300 297, 302 0, 500

A 2 300, 300 300, 300 250, 250 99, 104

6 302, 297 250, 250 100, 100 100, 100
8 500, 0 104, 99 100, 100 100, 100
This supergame has two equilibria: either both players play a tit-

for-tat strategy (rule 2) or they both always defect (rule 8). Note that
10. Brian Skyrms has discussed these rules that he calls "Markov habits" in the context
of dynamic deliberation on the part of Bayesian players. If Bayesian dynamic deliberators
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such simple adaptive behavior may not allow one to learn the strategy

of an opponent; a tit-for-tat player will never learn whether she was
matched with an unconditional cooperator or a tit-for-tatter, and an
uncompromising defector will never know whether he was matched with

a cautious cooperative type. Even if learning were to occur, it would not
be exploited to the advantage of the players: a prudent cooperator adopting
rule 8 will immediately learn whether her opponent is an unconditional
cooperator but will not exploit this knowledge to her advantage, while
a prudent cooperator and a tit-for-tat player will "lock" into a punitive

pattern, even if, by being lenient just once, either one could induce a
dramatic improvement in the overall outcome.
Consider what a player would choose, knowing that she can only
marginally adapt. If the opponent is a conditional cooperator, it is better

to cooperate, while a tit-for-tat strategy does little harm to a player in
case her opponent is the "always defect" type. If matched to a prudent

cooperator, it would be better to be unconditionally cooperative, but
unconditional cooperation is too risky a prospect, while tit for tat still
does better than the remaining rules. Note that tit for tat is a better
prospect even if the opponent is "smarter" than the player. Tit for tat
will protect the player from exploitation by someone endowed with greater
learning capabilities, since his defection will be immediately punished.

Hence we would expect adaptive players to choose rule 2 and settle on
the 2, 2 equilibrium.
This result, however, crucially depends on the payoffs associated
with the outcomes. Consider the following Prisoner's Dilemma matrix,
where the letters represent the payoffs obtained by the row player for
each combination of his and the opponent's strategies:
C D

C a b

D c d
Since it is a Prisoner's Dilemma, c > a > d > b. For n plays of the
game, dn is what a defector will score if matched with another defector,

while a tit-for-tat player matched with a defector gets dn - 1 + b. If
dn - (dn - 1 + b) is small, a player will be willing to cooperate, but as
dn - 1 + b decreases, the probability of choosing defection increases. If
unilateral cooperation were associated with a large loss, the 8, 8 outcome
would be more likely to obtain. Note that a player need not assign a high

probability to being matched with a cooperator in order to choose a titfor-tat strategy. In fact, in 100 repetitions of game 3, it is sufficient to

assign probability 0.047 to the other player's being a tit-for-tatter in order
have adequate common knowledge for deliberation, the greater the number of iterations,
the greater the degree of mutual distrust needed to justify the selection of the 'always
defect' rule. See B. Skyrms, "Deliberational Dynamics" (1989, typescript), chap. 6.
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to choose that strategy. However, the greater the loss associated with
unilateral cooperation, the higher the probability of being matched with
a cooperator must be in order to make one choose to be a conditional

cooperator. 1 1
Suppose now that the rewards associated with joint cooperation and
the punishments associated with joint defection are large enough to
justify a cooperative choice in a two-player repeated game, but that the
game being played is an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. If n is large enough
to guarantee a player's anonymity, the incentives change and universal
defection is to be expected. If, instead, the number of players is such
that one's defection can be easily detected and punished, the cooperative
equilibrium remains a possibility. The choice to be a conditional cooperator
will still depend upon whether unilateral cooperation is not too costly,
and if the payoff structure is favorable enough, individual cooperation
can be expected to continue as long as the group's past aggregate behavior
is cooperative. A behavioral regularity thus established can be highly
unstable, though; it will be very sensitive to variations in the payoff
structure. For example, since the players' adaptive rule only considers

what happened in the previous play, the fact that everyone has "conformed"
to a cooperative pattern for a long time has no effect upon the choice
of a rule the next time a Prisoner's Dilemma situation occurs; with a
payoff structure unfavorable to cooperation, an individual would choose
to defect. This conclusion is in line with what has been observed by other
writers in the field. Russell Hardin, for example, has pointed out that
often a cooperative outcome in the context of a repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma is due to the existence of "extraplay" incentives that influence
current choices. Such incentives, however, require a certain degree of

sophistication on the part of the players.'2 An example of an extraplay
incentive is the prospect of future activities involving the same participants,
or different ones that will be informed about the past behavior of the
players. Under these circumstances, it will be in the individual's interest

to create a reputation for being a trustworthy, cooperative type. But
reputation effects require that a player perceives his and others' choices

as contingent and is able to evaluate the future consequences of present
behavior.

What we need is a more complex adaptive dynamics, in which strategic

uncertainty and the acknowledgment of the possible effects of one's
adjustments on other players' adjustments play a greater role. Consider
again two rational players engaged in a Prisoner's Dilemma with a known
number of repetitions who do not have any information about each
11. This probability will remain quite small, though. For example, if the payoffs of

game 3 are slightly modified so that the loss associated with unconditional cooperation is
-5, the probability of being matched with a tit-for-tatter must be at least 0.069 for a player
to choose to play tit for tat in 100 repetitions of that game.

12. R. Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p.
164.
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other's type. The players may use introspective analysis to form their
prior probabilities about the other's type and in subsequent play try to
put those different hypotheses to test.
For example, the players may start by cooperating and see what
happens. After a few repetitions, each will have formed some hypothesis
about her opponent's strategy and will adjust her strategy accordingly.

In a simple, two-person interaction, it is likely that a player will take into
account the effects of her own adjustments upon her opponent's play,
whereas in a large population, one will take the current state of the rest
of the population as a prediction of its state at the next stage, since the
effects of one's adjustments on other people's future adjustments are
insignificantly small.

In order to eliminate some hypotheses, the players may "experiment"
with small deviations, which may or may not be profitable in terms of

payoffs.13 Consider, for example, the case in which both players cooperate
for n repetitions. Then a player may want to "test" the hypothesis that
her opponent is a retaliator by defecting in the next round. Her deviation
reveals to the other player that she is not an unconditional cooperator,

but it might also be taken as a signal that she is unwilling to cooperate
from now on, if the number of repetitions is small and the end is not
too far away. Testing a hypothesis involves deviating from one's strategy,
but it involves the risk of being misperceived by another player as being

part of a different strategy. Taking this possibility into account, a rational
player will be more likely to experiment at the beginning of the game,
in order to restrict the set of possible conjectures about her opponent's
type without "confusing" him too much.

Thus a tit-for-tat player may want to ascertain that he is not playing
with an unconditional cooperator, and a defector may want to test the

willingness of his opponent to "forgive" as well as the severity of his
retaliation policy. A prudent cooperator may want to learn if she is
playing with another prudent cooperator instead of a defector, whereas
an individual that believes he "deserves more" and thus plans to defect,

say, twice every three plays, will want to know whether he is playing with
a similarly convinced player or with a tit-for-tat retaliator. In the latter
case, the two patterns of play may look identical:
Player 1: C D D C D D C D D C D D ...

Player 2: D D C D D C D D C D D C ...
Player 1 may be a tit-for-tat player, but he may also be a conditional
cooperator that, like player 2, believes he is more deserving than his
opponent. If player 2 initially defects, it will be impossible for him to

know whether or not player l's pattern of play is independent of his
choices. A better strategy for player 2 would be to cooperate initially,
13. See D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps, "A Theory of Learning, Experimentation, and

Equilibrium in Games" (1988, typescript).
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since by the fifth play he will know whether he is playing against a
retaliator, in which case he would do better by modifying his strategy
and choosing to cooperate until the penultimate play. To see why it is
so, consider the following pattern of play of player 2 (who believes he
deserves more) against a tit-for-tat player:
Player 2: C D D C D D ...
Player 1: C C D D C D ...

The first three moves of player 1 may suggest a pattern of limited
cooperation that tells a player to defect once every three plays, and the
fourth move may or may not indicate retaliation, but by the fifth move

player 2 will come to see that player 1's next move is always identical to
his own previous move, signaling a retaliator that is quick to "forgive"

defection and reward cooperation. Note that "tougher" retaliatory strategies

will not do as well as tit for tat. For example, a tougher retaliator may
delay rewarding the opponent for cooperative behavior if there has been
a previous defection by restoring cooperation only after the opponent
has unsuccessfully cooperated once. The pattern of play may look like
this:

Player 1: C D D D D D C ...

Player 2: D D C D D C ...
Suppose player 2 is an exploitative type who would always defect in
the presence of unconditional cooperators unless she is convinced that

she is playing with a conditional cooperator who will punish her defection
and reward her cooperation, in which case she would maximize her

expected utility by cooperating. Since player 1 chooses to cooperate in
the first play, and defect in the second, player 2 suspects he is a tit-fortat player; in order to test her hypothesis, player 2 will deviate from her

strategy in the third play, since a tit-for-tat player will respond positively
to her signal in the next play. If player 1 keeps defecting, player 2 will
know for sure that he is not a tit-for-tat player, but the set of possible
strategies he may be playing is still very large. Player 1 may be a conditional
cooperator who punishes defection by defecting forever after; he may
be willing to signal a cooperative attitude at fixed intervals; he may be
a defector who made a mistake in his first move; he may be a "tough"
retaliator who will exploit twice or more in return for each exploitative

episode he had to suffer; and so on. Depending on the projected costs
of undergoing further testing, which will depend both on the assessed
probabilities of each hypothesis and the magnitude of the loss associated
with unreciprocated cooperation, player 2 may or may not attempt further
testing. This example suggests that a "tough" retaliator risks locking
himself in a self-defeating pattern, since punishment, to be effective,

must be easy to understand.14
14. I suspect that, whenever an unfair pattern of cooperation emerges, this is more

likely to be due to an underlying bargaining game in which one of the parties has greater
bargaining power rather than to be the outcome of poor learning.

Bicchieri Norms oJ Cooperation 855
Prudent cooperation is a difficult strategy to detect, too, since the
prudent cooperator will initiate the game by defecting and will subsequently
cooperate in response to a cooperative move of his opponent. When two
prudent cooperators are matched, their strategies will be indistinguishable
from an 'always defect' strategy, and they will keep defecting unless one

of them is willing to risk being twice "exploited" in order to test the
hypothesis that the opponent is not a defector.
In general, tit for tat has a big advantage over other strategies: it is

easy to learn, since it has a clearly recognizable pattern, and it protects
the player who adopts it from excessive exploitation by a defector; tit
for tat will at best tie, and at worst it will lose no more than one play.
Robert Axelrod believes that these features of tit for tat are responsible

for its overwhelming success in the computer tournaments he ran.15
When different strategies were paired off for round-robin tournaments

of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Axelrod found out that-if the probability of the game's continuing is sufficiently great-tit for tat scored
better than all the other strategies it competed with. What I am suggesting
here is that the very characteristics that make tit for tat successful in
computer tournaments are also likely to play an important role in all
those Prisoner's-Dilemma-like circumstances in which there is repeated
interaction but the player is uncertain as to his opponent's character.
Especially when the number of repetitions is small and experimenting
more costly, tit for tat seems likely to be chosen by a player who wants

to signal unambiguously his intentions and benefit from the possibility

of joint cooperation.
FROM TWO TO MANY

Once a cooperative equilibrium is established, we may expect it to persist,
since data from past experience can be used to predict how an opponent
will act in the future. If we learn that we are playing with a tit-for-tat
opponent, we recognize that unilateral defection is going to be punished
immediately. Under these circumstances, each player will prefer to co-

operate if the other cooperates, and each will attach high probability to
the opponent playing his part in the equilibrium; hence, each player will
have a decisive reason to stick to cooperative behavior. Note that common
knowledge has not been assumed nor is it needed to maintain conformity.

Since the players will have probabilistic beliefs "close" to the equilibrium
but not full knowledge, beliefs will be quasi-consistent, but not necessarily
fully consistent, with each other. However, once players' expectations

are close to the cooperative equilibrium, they will tend to persist because
of reinforcing feedback: each player will play her part in the equilibrium,
which will lead the other to expect with greater certainty that the equilibrium
accurately predicts what the opponent will do in the future.
Such a stable equilibrium is a norm of cooperation, since it fulfills
the conditions that define a social norm as a function of the preferences
15. See R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984), p. 53.
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and beliefs of the members of the population in which that behavioral
regularity exists. It is easy to see how approval and disapproval play only

a secondary role in eliciting conformity. If another player defects, one
is made worse off in two respects: there is an immediate loss and one is
forced to punish the defector in the next round. The obvious disapproval
that accompanies defection reinforces a cooperative attitude; it cannot,
however, substitute for conditional preferences and beliefs in eliciting
cooperation.

We may expect a norm of cooperation to emerge as a stationary

equilibrium in a group of players in which the identities of the players
and the experiences they have had with each other matter. Once a norm
of cooperation has been established in a dyadic interaction, it will tend
to persist and elicit conformity in new situations in which both cooperative

and competitive strategies are possible. If the subjects involved are the

same, or if they carry with them reputations from past play, mutual
expectations are likely to be quasi-consistent, since each individual will
tend to believe that what has happened in the past is a good predictor
of what will happen in the future.
The larger the population becomes, however, the more individuals

will tend to ignore the effects of their adjustments on the future course
of play of other individuals, as their identity (and reputation) will matter
less and less. In fact, I doubt that learning is possible in large, anonymous
groups. In large groups, an individual's choice has an insignificant impact

on the collective outcome, and defection is likely to go undetected. In
those circumstances, experimenting with small deviations from one's

strategy makes no sense, since no response is likely to follow. The only
data available to predict the future state of the population is its past and
current aggregate behavior, so if cooperation has taken place in the past,
individuals will tend to expect it to occur in the future, too. In these
circumstances, expectations of cooperative behavior will be self-defeating
and expectations of defecting behavior self-fulfilling.
If people can learn to cooperate only in dyadic or small-group interactions, the explanation of how norms of cooperation emerge as equi-

librium patterns of behavior does not extend to large, anonymous groups,
where the presence of conforming behavior might be rather explained

by the diffusion of small-group norms through an evolutionary process.
Russell Hardin has pointed to the overlapping nature of group activities
and the tendency to generalize to similar cases as possible mechanisms
through which conventions involving large populations are built up out

of dyadic interactions.16 Examples are the norms of truth telling a
promise keeping. One will presumably learn that it is better to be sincere

and trustworthy in the context of repeated interactions with the same
small group of people and will later adopt the same behavior in situations
that are sufficiently similar to the original ones or that involve reputation
16. Ibid., p. 196.
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effects, in that violation of the norm is taken to signal a flawed character,
and this in turn will jeopardize future interactions. Another striking
example of widespread cooperative behavior is the development of the
"honor code" that governed international commerce in the thirteen century.
It was common for merchants to buy on credit and clear their debts at

some future time; all the seller got was a "bill of exchange," a written
promise to pay a sum of money at some future date. Henry Pirenne

noted that, since metallic money was scarce, the massive development of

commerce was made possible by the practice of credit, which involved
the use of bills of exchange as money.'7 It was not the enforcement of
a government but rather the trustworthiness of the issuer that backed a
bill of exchange and made it usable as a means of payment. All this would
have been infeasible had the merchants not been in continual relations

of debt and credit with one another and thus concerned with good standing
among their peers. One can imagine the original development of norms
of business conduct among a few local merchants, their spread to a larger

business community through the repeated contacts with foreign merchants
provided by international fairs, and finally the emergence of a general,
unspoken code of behavior regulating the activities of an international
community of merchants and bankers.

An evolutionary model of the spread of a behavioral pattern over

an entire population is not in conflict with an explanation of its emergence
in terms of individual learning in repeated small-group interactions.
Voting, contributing to public charities, and refraining from littering or
polluting are choices that are not easily amenable to a rational explanation.
They need not be, however, thought of as counterexamples to rational
choice theory. They may result from compliance with norms of cooperation
that emerged out of rational behavior in other contexts and were subsequently extended to the entire population through selection pressures.
The advantages of supplementing a rational choice explanation with an

evolutionary approach are twofold. On the one hand, an evolutionary
model does not require sophisticated reasoning and learning in circumstances, such as large-group interactions, in which it would be unrealistic

to assume them. We may, rather, suppose that some behavioral patterns
borne out of strategic interactions spread and evolve in a large population
out of simple adaptive mechanisms. It is not too farfetched to assume
that strategies that make a person do better than others will be retained,
while strategies that lead to failure will be abandoned. Another plausible
mechanism is imitation: those who do best are observed by others who
subsequently emulate their behavior.

Whether a behavioral pattern that has emerged in a small group
will survive in a larger population is an important question to address,
and an evolutionary model provides a description of the conditions under
17. H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (New, York: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1936).
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which social norms may spread. One may think of several environments
to start with. A population can be represented as entirely homogeneous,
in the sense that everybody is adopting the same type of behavior, or
heterogeneous to various degrees. In the former case, it is important to
know whether the commonly adopted behavior is stable against mutations.
For example, experiments conducted by Axelrod and Maynard Smith
and Price show that tit for tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy, which
means that a population of individuals that adopt it cannot be successfully
invaded by isolated mutants, since the mutants will be at a disadvantage

with respect to reproductive success.18 It is also well known that a population
of defectors cannot be invaded by isolated cooperators. A more interesting
case, and one relevant to a study of the reproduction of norms of co-

operation, is that of a population in which several competing strategies
are present at any given time. What we want to know is whether the
present strategy frequencies are stable or if there is a tendency for one
strategy to become dominant over time.
What follows is a simple example of an evolutionary process. A game
is repeated n times, and after each round of the game, the actual payoffs
and strategies of the players become public knowledge; on the basis of
this information, each player is allowed to adjust his strategy for the next

round. More formally, let pit be the frequency of strategy i in population
P at time t, and let Hij be the payoff to adopting strategy i if the opponent

plays strategy. Let Hit = Ij Hijpit be the total payoff of playing i at time
t, which may also be interpreted as i's fitness at time t. Note that the total

payoff is the weighted sum of the different payoffs one obtains by being
matched with different types of strategies, where the weights represent

the frequencies of those strategies in the entire population at time t. pit+ 1

(Pit, P2t, . . .) represents the frequency of strategy i at time t + 1 as

function of the relative frequencies at time t of all the available strategies

(including i), and thus depends on the total payoff of playing strategy i
at time t, since it is the payoff one obtains by playing a given strategy
that determines whether one is going to play it again or to abandon it.
The dynamics of the frequency distributions of the strategies can be
represented as follows:

f (Hzt)Pit

Pit+i = f(.)p.' (1)
wheref (fit) is the reproduction rate of strategy i and is a monotonically
increasing function of the total payoff of playing strategy i at time t.

An equilibrium is a frequency vector (Pi, P2,. . .) that reproduces
itself over time. A pure strategy equilibrium is one in which only one
18. See, e.g., J. Maynard Smith and G. Price, "The Logic of Animal Conflict," Nature
246 (1973): 15-18.
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strategy is played by the entire population, that is, it is a vector where

pn = 1, and pi = 0 for all i =# n. Of course, any such vector reprodu
itself, but what we want to know is whether it is stable against mutations.

Given two strategies i and n, the frequency of i over time will decrease
if the reproduction rate of strategy n matched with n is greater than that

of strategy i matched with n, that is, pit > pit+, in each period as long

the ratio f1Min < I for each i #& n.
Given a fixed population, the number of mutants rises whenever
the fitness associated with the mutant strategy is higher. Following Maynard
Smith, the condition that makes an equilibrium stable over mutations is

that, for each i #& n, Hin < flen 19
Consider the simple case in which there are only two possible strategies:
tit for tat (T) and defect (D). This simplification helps in understanding
the dynamic process that becomes much more complex with a higher
number of strategies but does not affect the generality of the analysis.

Let p = frequency of strategy T and 1 -p = frequency of strategy D.
We may rewrite equation (1) as

Pt+if (Tt)Pt
f (Tt)Pt
+ f (Dt)(I - Pt)
f [PtHTT + (1 Pt)rHTD]Pt
f [P tHTT + (1 - Pt)HTD]Pt + f [P tHDT + (1 - P6HDD]( - Ptt)

We want to find the solution p to the above equation in the nontrivial
case in which A is different from 0 and 1. That is, we look for a value of
p such that-if the frequency of tit-for-tatters in the population is equal
to or greater than it-the dynamics will favor tit-for-tatters, and, at that
value, the number of conditional cooperators will be stable. Substituting

b in the above equation, we obtain
[P 11+ (1 p-)TD] = f[pHTT + (1 P- TD p
+ f[pHDT + (1 - p)DD](1 -p

and, solving for p, we get
AIDD - 11TD

= 1ITT + 11DD - 11DT - 11TD
Suppose there have been n repetitions of game 3. The payoffs obtained
by playing T or D against an opponent who plays, respectively, T or D

19. J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge Unive
Press, 1982).
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are the following: rIDD = n; r1TT = 2n; r1TD = n - 1; r1DT = n + 4. In
this case, assuming that n is at least 4, the minimum value at which a

group of tit-for-tatters can survive in a population of defectors is
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(n
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2n + n - (n + 4) - (n - 1) n - 3

If n is greater than 4, this is a fraction less than 1. For values greater
thank, tit for tat will notjust survive but thrive, as more and more players
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will see the advantage of adopting it. However, if the frequency of titfor-tatters is lower than p, cooperative behavior will get less and less
frequent in each period and will eventually disappear (see fig. 1). On

the other hand, if n is less than 4, no matter how many tit-for-tat mutants
enter a population of defectors at once, their frequency will decrease in

each period and eventually go to zero (see fig. 2).
This simple example illustrates the general point that norms of
cooperation that emerged in a small group may extend to a population

through an evolutionary process; if the number of repetitions is sufficiently
large, a small proportion of cooperators can take over an entire population.
CONCLUSION

The above scenario encompasses several ideas that have so far been kept

apart. The emergence of norms is an example of spontaneous order, a
form of coordination that takes place without the intervention of a central

authority and does not presuppose previous agreements or common
knowledge among the parties. Yet social norms embody some form of
rationality and are ultimately reducible to individual preferences and
beliefs. The traditional game-theoretic account has the merit of emphasizing
the interdependent nature of the preferences and expectations that sustain
social norms, but does not explain how expectations are formed. What
is presented here is a plausible reconstruction of how norms of cooperation
can emerge through learning in small-group, repeated interactions and

be subsequently adopted by larger groups of people. In this sense, evolutionary and rational choice explanations complement each other.

